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La complejidad y el proceso donde emergen nuevos 
fenómenos a partir de más básicos son nociones 
básicas para entender y mejorar el aprendizaje. Por 
un lado, con conceptos complejos los estudiantes se 
desconciertan y el aprendizaje se vuelve muy difícil. 
Por otro lado, los procesos en los que emergen 
nuevos fenómenos parecen ser mágicos o ilusiones 
cognitivas. Parecen basarse en cualidades 
adicionales que no están incluidas en los fenómenos 
subyacentes. ¿Puede el docente simplificar las 
nociones complejas sin cambiarlas? Para ello, 
argumentamos que la complejidad y el proceso de 
emerger no son exclusivamente inherentes a objetos 
o fenómenos. También dependen del sistema 
perceptivo, motor y cognitivo del estudiante. Así, si 
el profesor ayuda a conectar nociones y fenómenos 
con el conocimiento innato y corporizado de los 
estudiantes, entonces estas nociones se vuelven 
menos complejas y el fenómeno emergente pierde su 
magia: se conecta lógicamente con los fenómenos 
subyacentes. En este artículo presentamos evidencia 
empírica del efecto en la comprensión de los 
estudiantes debido a la conexión establecida en dos 
conceptos matemáticos centrales del currículo y que 
se consideran muy desafiantes. 
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Complexity and emergence are core notions for 
understanding and improving learning. On one hand, 
with complex concepts students struggle and 
learning becomes very difficult. On the other hand, 
emergence phenomena looks like magic or cognitive 
illusions, they seem to rely on extra qualities not 
included in the subjacent phenomena. Can the 
teacher simplify complex notions without changing 
them? In order to do that, we argue complexity and 
emergency are not exclusively inherent to objects or 
phenomena. They also depend on the perceptual, 
motor and cognitive system of the student. Thus, if 
the teacher helps to connect notions and phenomena 
to students' innate and embodied knowledge, then 
these notions become less complex and the emergent 
phenomenon loses its magic: it becomes logically 
connected to the subjacent phenomena. In this paper 
we present empirical evidence of the effect on 
students understanding due to the connection 
stablished in two core curriculum mathematical 
concepts that are considered very challenging. 
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What does it mean that a concept is complex? What 
does it mean that a phenomenon emerges from other 
phenomena? Complexity and emergence are notions 
that have being the subject of extensive studies 
(Kolmogorov, 1968; Chaitin, 1974; Holland, 1998; 
Gell-Mann, 1995, 2000; Simon 1996). They are 
crucial to understand the world and to interact with 
it. But what does it mean that a phenomenon is more 
complex than another one? How can complexity be 
measured? For example, why a straight line is 
simpler than other curves? If biology can be 
obtained from chemistry and chemistry from 
physics, then in what sense biology is more 
complex? Is it because biology requires more 
computational power to deduce it from physics than 
the computational power required to deduce 
chemistry from physics? Several challenges appear 
when the notion of complexity is studied. The 
mathematician John Casti (Araya, 2000b), suggests 
that to handle properly more complex structures 
such as the ones in the social sciences a new 
mathematics is needed. It would not be enough to 
explicit behavioral rules. It would be needed to 
describe systems with more flexible rules, rules that 
can improve themselves. More complexity also 
introduces the phenomenon of emergence. This 
means new structures and phenomena, which cannot 
be straightforwardly reduced to subjacent and 
simpler ones, seem to appear (emerge) as the 
complexity is increased. 
A definition of complexity of a phenomenon 
must somehow consider the difficulty to describe the 
phenomenon. For example, a widely used way of 
expressing this difficulty is to consider the size of 
the minimal description of the phenomenon 
(Kolmogorov, 1968; Chaitin, 1974). This idea, that 
in principle seems to be conceptually very clear, has 
a couple of hidden details that are crucial. First, 
there is the need to precise what does it mean to 
describe a phenomenon. Second, there is also the 
issue of the way to specify those descriptions. What 
marks or signs are used and on what format. The 
process of selection of the relevant factors is a 
critical one. A night can be described as a black sky, 
or, alternatively, as a sky filled with a very detailed 
distribution of stars. In the first case it is a very 
simple phenomenon, but in the second case it is a 
very complex one.  
Given this difficulty, it is common to define 
complexity of a phenomenon using an already made 
description of it. For example, a written description 
in English, or a mathematical equation, or an array 
of pixels of different colors. All of these descriptions 
can be viewed as a long string of zeroes and ones. 
Just think that any text with images and formulas 
written in a word processor is internally saved as a 
string of zeroes and ones. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to forget that the string of zeroes and 
ones presupposes a selection of certain features of 
the phenomenon.   
Murray Gell-Mann (Gell-Mann, 1995) proposes a 
definition of complexity that makes explicit this 
dependence on the previously selected 
characteristics of the phenomenon. Complexity is 
the size of the more compact description of the 
concepts, schemes and rules that capture the 
preselected regularities of the phenomenon. He call 
it, effective complexity, to differentiate it from other 
definitions. For example, a sequence of zeroes and 
ones produced by a random number generator has 
very low effective complexity if the description 
selected is the algorithm that the computer uses. 
Instead, if the description selected is the exact 
sequence then it has a very high effective 
complexity. The phenomena can have diverse 
complexities depending on the regularities selected 
and described. Thus, the effective complexity of a 
phenomenon depends on an observer that describe 
the phenomenon. The observer could be a human, a 
non-human animal, or even a machine. It has to be 
something that selects regularities.  
2 COMPLEXITY 
2.1 Complexity depends on the Perceptual, 
Motor and Cognitive Systems of the 
Observer 
Let´s consider the example proposed in (Araya, 
2006). Look at figure 1, which is half of a figure 





Imagine that the picture is analyzed by a simple 
machine that observes the image through a camera 
lens and that detects that over a black background 
there are several small white squares, arranged on 





rows and columns. All the description produced by 
the machine would be the size of the squares and its 
distribution in an array of 18 columns and 9 rows. 





Another more sophisticated machine could detect 
that the squares of the original figure are arranged in 
different inclination angles. This machine include in 
the description all those inclination angles. Clearly 
figure 1 will be more complex for this machine since 
the description is longer. It requires to specify the tilt 
angle of each of the 162 squares (18 columns by 9 
rows). 
Look at figure 1 again. If you are like me, you 
will notice the spontaneous emergence of a dynamic 
pattern. Arcs that are formed and disappear, to again 
appear and disappear. Will other animals detect this 
dynamic pattern? For an observer that detects the 
dynamic pattern the complexity of figure 1 is clearly 
bigger than just an array of squares with different 
inclination angles. The observer that detects such a 
dynamic pattern phenomenon would require an 
additional description to be able to communicate 
what happens to another observer that is not viewing 
figure 1 and has never seen it before.  
Let´s imagine that we send the simple text 
description of the distribution of the white squares 
with its inclinations angles to another animal or 
machine. It can only detect or experience the 
dynamic pattern phenomenon if it has similar 
perceptual and processing algorithms to handle 
visual information. Moreover, the dynamic pattern 
detection requires not only that the observer has 
these perceptual and processing algorithms but also 
that he uses them to process the figure. If you send a 
textual description of figure 1 to another person that 
has never seen it, he would not experience the 
dynamic pattern. He will have to draw and paint a 
picture according to the textual description, and only 
when finished and then look with his own eyes at the 
drawn picture he will detect those dynamic patterns. 
Thus, the dynamic phenomenon depends critically of 
his particular vision system. This is similar to what 
you experience when watching movies. They are 
just a sequence of still pictures. It is your perceptual, 
motor and cognitive system that builds the 
movement.  
This example suggests that another component in 
complexity is the dependence on the perceptual, 
motor and cognitive systems of the observer. It is 
then an embodied complexity. Two observers that 
look at figure 1 but with different visual and 
cognitive systems, will most probably assign 
different complexity to figure 1.   
2.2 Embodied Information 
The dependence of complexity on the observer is 
similar to the dependence of the standard notion of 
information. For John Casti (2000), one of the most 
common uses of information is as a measure of 
novelty or surprise. Intuitively, if something is 
known and recurrent, then the fact that someone tells 
us that that event is occurring does not bring us 
much information. The information level is close to 
zero. On the contrary, if we are told that now is 
occurring something very infrequent then that 
warning bring us a lot of information. This means 
that the information of an event increases as the 
probability of the event is lower. Thus, it is much 
more information to you to know that there is a tiger 
close to you than to know that you are close to an 
ant. This is because you assign much less probability 
that a tiger appears close to you than an ant. Note 
that, similar to what happens to the notion of 
complexity, there is the critical dependence on the 
observer. The same event for an observer can be 
very improbable, and then brings high information 
to know about it, but for another observer could be 
highly probable. To a zoo worker it is not highly 
surprising to be close to a tiger. And thus, the fact of 
knowing that event, does not bring to him a lot of 
information.  
This means that the information of an event 
depends on the experience, knowledge and previous 
learnings of the observer. In other words, it depends 
on the a priori probabilities that the different events 
have for the observer. This is a crucial point, and it 
is one that shows the strong link between 
information and semantics. According to Rieke et al. 
(1997), the misunderstanding of this fact has led to 
the unsupported opinion that the theory of 
information is not relevant to biology and 
neurosciences. It is frequently argued that 
information theory does not take into account the 
features of the world that interest the organism, 
neither it would discard those facts or features that 
doesn´t interest him. And therefore, information 
theory would be “blind to semantics or meaning”. 






belief that the theory of information measures the 
information as in a computer hard drive, 
independent of any observer. That it is just a thing of 
bits, just an account of zeroes and ones. This is far to 
be that way. The information in Shannon´s theory 
depends on a priori probabilities. On these a priori 
probabilities are included the interests and 
knowledge on the observer. There it is the 
evolutionary design of the species, the ecological 
niche where the observer´s species has inhabited and 
reproduced by thousands of generations.   
For example, the presence of a predator in front 
of an observer is a very improbable event, but much 
more meaningful than the fact that he is next to an 
ant. To be in front of a natural predator is very 
relevant to his survival and is rather infrequent. It is 
a big surprise. Therefore to be warned about it is 
very valuable information.  This means that the a 
priori probabilities is a way to account for the model 
of the world that the observer has. These 
probabilities are critical to compute the information 
level of an event. Additionally, given that the 
observer´s world model is continuously varying, it 
changes while the observer interacts with the world 
and learn from it, then the same event means 
different levels of information according to when it 
is measured. The complexity of a phenomenon, 
similarly to the information of an event, depends on 
the observer and his perceptual, motor and cognitive 
system. It depends on his interests and experience. 
Therefore, it is connected to semantics, to the 
meaning that the phenomenon has for the observer. 
2.3 Dependence on the format 
The dependence on the observer and his perceptual, 
motor and cognitive systems leads us to another 
crucial aspect that has been recently attracted the 
attention of evolutionary psychology: the format in 
which the phenomenon is presented. A perceptual 
system works properly only if the input signal has 
the required format. If it is in a different format, it 
doesn´t work or it generates a different result. If 
figure 1 is presented as a list of zeroes, ones and 
instructions to reconstruct the image from those 
numbers, then the dynamic pattern phenomenon is 
not generated on the observer. The dynamic pattern 
emerges only if the observer has a perceptual system 
as the human visual system and he looks with his 
own eyes the reconstructed two dimensional image.  
Information described in formats mathematically 
equivalent could be processed by completely 
different algorithms, and therefore by different 
neuronal areas and circuits.  For this reason, even 
though two formats seems equivalent, the 
corresponding perceptual, motor and cognitive 
module can produce completely different responses.  
According to the evolutionary psychologists 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1996), the 
cognitive system is a set of computational machines, 
each designed by natural selection to solve some of 
the recurrent problems of the species. Each of this 
machines works on a very specific environment and 
process information properly only if the information 
is in a very particular format. It is the format that for 
thousands of generations the corresponding machine 
has worked on and has being gaining a highly 
precise specialization. This format is what the 
psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (2000) call the 
ecologically valid format.  
After reviewing the previous example, one could 
think that the complexity dependence is a particular 
case of visual input and the visual system. Let´s look 
other examples of different nature. Consider the 
mindreading system that recognize agents and its 
intentions. In 1944 Heider and Simmel (Baron-
Cohen, 1997) asked subjects to watch a silent short 
film in which two triangles and a circle move 
around. When the subjects were asked to describe 
what they had just seen, they described the figures as 
agents, socially interacting within them, and trying 
to pursue specific goals. According to Baron-Cohen, 
there is an innate intentionality detector system that 
interprets motion stimuli in terms of the primitive 
volitional mental states of goal and desire. In this 
case, from the movements of the geometric figures 
emerges a completely new phenomenon: a social 
drama. This is possible because the observer has the 
mechanisms already in place to automatically 
interpret certain objects and their movements as 
social interaction. Therefore, the complexity of the 
film and the emergence of a pattern of social 
dynamics depend critically on the intentional system 
of the observer.  Someone with a different 
intentional system or with one damaged as 
apparently is the case on certain autist patients, will 
not see the emergence of the social dynamics. 
Therefore the complexity of the film will be 
completely different. It would be needed to add an 
explicit account of the interpretation of the figures as 
agents and the whole set of motions as a social 
struggle to obtain certain goals. All these extra 
description would increase the length of the 
description, and therefore increase its complexity.  
Let´s analyze a more abstract case that illustrate 
the dependence of complexity on the observer 
cognitive system, with no or very little intervention 
of the perceptual and motor systems. Daniel 
Povinelli (Povinelli, 2000) in several experiments 





with chimpanzees that required the use of tools to 
solve problems reaching foods on tubes, concluded 
that even though a major part of the same human 
perceptual-motor abilities are involved, the 
chimpanzees do not represent abstract variables as 
causes of objects interactions. This inability to 
reinterpret observable physical events in terms of 
unobservable causal phenomena (such as forces), is 
an important difference in the cognitive system of 
the two species. Without this ability, not only 
chimpanzees are unable to solve several simple 
problems using tools that young kids do solve, but 
also they are unable to detect certain regularities in a 
more abstract plane. For Daniel Povinelli the human 
cognitive system may effectively “crowd out” the 
most detailed level of perceptual information in 
favor of more abstract representations, and thus it is 
vulnerable to “conceptual intrusions”. Therefore a 
human observer would see emerge different 
phenomena than a chimpanzee observer. Since they 
suffer less from such conceptual intrusions, 
chimpanzees extract highly specific rules from their 
experiences. It seems that they exhibit skills of 
visual rule extraction which are superior to our own 
(Povinelli, 2000), and in some symbolic numeric 
tasks they exhibit skills of visual rule recollection 
much superior to humans (Inoue & Matsuzawa, T., 
2007). Something similar happens with autist 
patients, who pay more attention to details of objects 
and events, as proposed to more global and abstract 
levels. According to Allan Snyder (Snyder et Al., 
2004) with maturation the human mind becomes 
increasingly aware of concepts alone with exclusion 
of details. This inhibition of details from conscious 
awareness can be turned off on normal subjects by 
transcranial magnetic stimulation transforming their 
behavior to one closer to the behavior of autistic 
savants in several tasks (Bossomaier, 2004).   
2.4 Complexity is no a relative or arbitrary 
concept 
The perceptual, motor and cognitive systems have 
strong inductive and reasoning biases (Baum, 2004; 
Pinker, 2002; Mercer & Sperber, 2017). It is not a 
blank slate. This means that it looks for certain very 
specific patterns and discards most of other 
possibilities. The bias is encoded on our genetic 
code and in the interaction with the environment. 
For example, there is a bias for linear relations, and 
therefore we find a straight line much simpler than a 
quadratic or polynomial one, even when they are 
specified with the same number of parameters. This 
could be because straight line are important to 
navigation and prediction (line of the horizon, the 
trajectory of falling of an object). There is also a 
strong bias for faces, and therefore we find a face a 
simpler image than a detailed diagram of an 
electronic circuit, even if the diagram has less 
number of lines than the face. We easily see faces 
when exposed to visual stimuli like clouds, but we 
don´t see electronic diagrams. There is also a strong 
bias for cause-effect relations on temporally 
successive events and storytelling is our natural way 
of making causal sense (Sloman & Fernbach, 2017). 
There is also a strong bias towards real time 
performance and therefore towards frugal heuristics 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999), that make possible fast and 
ecologically effective decisions. Learning would be 
impossible without all these built-in biases, because 
at any given moment the number of possible 
alternatives is mind boggling. 
These biases come from millions of years of an 
evolutionary process of selection and adaptation. 
Evolution has selected and refined computational 
algorithms that now contains a strong bias that 
successfully reflect the structure of the world. There 
is then a good fit between the structure of theses 
biases and heuristics and the structure of the 
environment where they are applied to (Gigerenzer 
et Al, 1999). With these biases subjects can learn 
very rapidly, because they explore a very small 
number of already tested and successful possibilities.  
This explains why we find certain phenomena 
simpler than other phenomena. The features that the 
observer selects are not arbitrary or random. They 
are selected because the observer´s perceptual, 
cognitive and motor system already know they are 
effective. They have a proved predictive power.  
Thus, complexity depends on the observer and 
his perceptual, motor and cognitive system. It is 
embodied. But these systems successfully capture 
the structure of the world. Two different human 
observers select the same features because they have 
the same inductive bias. Therefore the effective 
complexity will be similar. You and I agree that a 
straight line is simpler than other curves and that the 
movement of a stone falling is simpler than the 
movement of a jaguar.  
One could argue than a completely different 
being, a Martian for example, could select 
completely different features of phenomena and 
therefore its complexity would be different. But this 
would mean that his inductive biases are completely 
different from ours. This possibility cannot be 
discarded but any living being has to live under the 
same physics, and therefore much of the inductive 
biases have to be similar. For example the 






they are social beings, then several strategies of 
social interaction have to be similar to our own. 
Under these same constraints it is difficult to 
conceive a radically different set of inductive biases, 
and therefore the observer will select somehow 
similar features and patterns. 
2.5 Ecologically valid strategies for 
teaching core concepts 
How can we apply these connections to innate and 
embodied knowledge for designing lessons? Let´s 
consider the case of fractions. This is a core 
mathematical concept that students start to learn 
from third grade.  Teaching fractions is perhaps the 
most challenging educational problem in elementary 
and middle school mathematics (Bailey et al., 2012; 
Siegler et al. 2010, Siegler et al. 2017). One critical 
problem is the interference induced by the two 
whole numbers that specify a fraction. Thus, when 
comparing two fractions, there are 4 whole numbers 
that have to be considered. It is widely documented 
that the biggest whole number primes the selection 
of the bigger fraction. This phenomenon is called the 
whole-number bias (Obersteoner et al, 2013). This 
effect is augmented when the two bigger whole 
numbers belongs to the same fraction (as numerator 
and denominator). However foraging and 
interchange ratios are widely used by several 
species, where organisms are constantly comparing 
ratios to make foraging and reproductively 
meaningful decisions. For example, there are widely 
documented biological markets in non-human 
primates where subjects track interchange ratios in 
the interchange of grooming with other services 
(Fruteau et al, 2009).  
Inspired in these facts we compared (Jiménez & 
Araya, 2013) the effect of a temporal frequency 
(foraging) format and an interchange format on the 
strength of whole number bias in fraction 
comparisons in 213 fourth graders (109 girls and 
104 boys). We considered three conditions: 
congruent tasks, when the biggest number belongs to 
the biggest fraction; simple incongruent tasks, when 
the biggest number belongs to the smallest fraction 
but the second biggest number belong to the biggest 
fraction; and the double incongruent tasks, when the 
two biggest numbers belong to the smallest fraction. 
Fraction comparisons using the time frequency and 
interchange formats produce high reduction of 
whole number bias for the simple incongruent tasks 
in comparison to normal symbolic format for 
fractions. A smaller but still statistically significant 
reduction of whole number bias is also obtained for 
the double incongruent case. This finding can be 




After the pretest students were randomly 
assigned to three training conditions. Fractions as 
partitions (the usual pizza like representations), 
fractions as temporal rates and fractions as 
interchange rates. Then all students answered a 
symbolic fraction comparison posttest. We found 
that for the double incongruent tasks the students 
that were trained in fractions as a temporal rate and 
fractions as interchange rates had better score than 
the other students. 
A similar study with first order equations was 
obtained (Araya et al., 2010).  A total of 236 seventh 
grade students who had never been taught algebraic 
equations before were randomly divided into two 
groups. The students in one group watched a 15-
minute video teaching them how to solve five 
different first-degree linear equations using a 
traditional symbolic strategy, while in the other 
group, the students watched a 15-minute video 
teaching them how to solve the same equations 
using four analogies for solving an equation: a two-
pan balance for the equals sign, a box for a variable, 
candies for numbers, and guessing the number of 
candies inside a box. The students were then tested 
on 12 equation solving problems, all of them 
written, using only symbolic notation. The group 
that watched the analogies video performed 
significantly better. Students with a below-average 
mathematics GPA who watched the analogies video 
did as well as students with an above-average GPA 
who watched the symbolic strategy video. Students 
who watched the analogies video also reached a 
better conceptual understanding, were better at 
making generalizations, did significantly better on 
reasoning problems involving equations, and had a 
better affective reaction. A possible explanation is 
that the two-pan balance equilibrium and the 
procedures of adding and subtracting the same 
amount of candies or boxes on both sides of the two-
pan balance are part of our biological primary 
cognition (Geary, 2007). This is probably folk 





physics knowledge. The use of analogies establishes 
a mapping between such biologically primary 
knowledge and the abstract mathematical concepts 
of algebraic equation solving. 
3 EMERGENCE 
3.1 Embodiment in emergence 
According to John Holland (Holland, 1998), 
subassemblies have a critical role in fostering 
emergence. The combinations of basic building 
blocks is similar to what Holland call the Greek 
approach to machines, where every machine can be 
constructed from copies of six basic mechanisms: 
the lever, the screw, the inclined plane, the wedge, 
the wheel and the pulley. When several of these 
building blocks are put together sometimes an 
emergent phenomenon is produced. But, will the 
building blocks and rules for combining them be 
sufficient to be able to generate an emergent 
phenomenon? Holland uses generalized building 
blocks that he calls constrained generating 
procedures. These are systems that according to its 
inner states and the stimuli received behave in a 
definite way specified unequivocally by certain 
rules. Connecting these devices a new constrained 
generative procedure of a higher level is obtained. 
The new higher level devices can also be combined 
to obtain a device of even higher level, and so on. At 
certain level, different from the basic level, some 
regularities can be obtained. These regularities are 
the emergent phenomena that Holland studies. They 
are macro laws that not necessarily can predict all 
future behavior, but capture some of the important 
regularities at that description level. These 
regularities are detected when expressed in the right 
format, because they resonate with inductive biases 
of the perceptual, cognitive and motor system of the 
observer.  
To explore the role of the observer on the 
emergence of a new phenomenon when combining 
some building blocks we analyze some examples. 
First, consider the dynamic pattern phenomenon that 
emerges in figure 1. It seems that it is needed a 
minimum number of elements to have the 
emergence phenomenon. In the following sequence, 
the visual and cognitive algorithms produce a 
dynamic pattern if there are at least six rows and six 
columns of squares. Figure 9, for example, does not 
produce the dynamic pattern phenomenon on human 
observers.  
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Look now Figure 10. It has 16 squares arranged 
in a four by four array, where each square is rotated 
22.5 degrees with respect to a neighbor square. This 
Figure does not generate the dynamic pattern 
illusion in a human observer, and therefore we can 
agree that its complexity is less than the complexity 
of figure 1. However next to it there is Figure 11, 
which is exactly Figure 10 repeated four times 
towards the right and four times to the bottom of the 
page. Even though figure 10 does not generate the 
dynamic pattern illusion, Figure 11 does generate 
the dynamic illusion. Therefore, the act of repetition 
of the same figure generates a figure of higher 
complexity. This emergence of higher complexity 
shows again the dependence on the format and 
observer´s perceptual, motor and cognitive system. 
Since figure 10 doesn´t generate a dynamic 
phenomenon a textual description of figure 10 would 
seem to be enough to compute its complexity.  Then 
a textual description specifying the successive 
repetition of figure 10 would be enough to describe 
figure 11. But this is not so. It is required to do the 
repetition in the adequate visual format and then 
look at the formed figure 11 to appreciate that the 
complexity is more than just  the complexity of the 
seed figure 10 repeated 16 times.   
Let´s consider now figure 12 as the seed figure 
and repeat it 4 times to the right and four times to 
the bottom of the page to form figure 13. Clearly 
figure 13 does not generate the same dynamic 
pattern phenomenon that figure 11 generates. It 
generates a different dynamic pattern illusion. It is 
not simple to say which is more complex, the one 
generated by 11 or the one generated by 13. 
However, it seems that the seed figure 10 is more 
complex than the seed figure 12, or at least than the 
seed figure 14 that also generates figure 13 by 
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Now look again at figure 1 but from a distance of 
one or two meters far way. The squares seem fuzzy 
and the dynamic pattern phenomenon disappears. 
But a fuzzy image is equivalent to distort each 
square or pass it through a filter that adds noise. 
Therefore, each square is more complex, since a 
longer description is needed for each one. One 
would expect then that the complexity of the whole 
figure 1 seen from that distance is increased, but the 
dynamic pattern is now not present for a human 
observer. That means a more complex seed produces 
an apparently less complex output figure than the 
one produced from a simpler seed.  
It is difficult to explain these emergent 
phenomena if we let the observer out of the factors. 
For example, if we imagine a camera with a 
hardware specialized to recognize squares, then 
several squares will emerge from Figures 12 and 13, 
and no one from figure 10 and 11.   
3.2 Emergent illusions in cognition 
One could think that this view of emergence is 
particular to the visual system. It is just a 
phenomenon of visual illusion. One could also think 
that this type of emergent illusions happens also in 
other perceptual systems. It is more difficult though 
to believe that this emergent illusions also happens 
on more abstract phenomena, such as in 
mathematical thinking.  
Let´s look then a purely cognitive example, 
highly relevant in mathematics education. Let´s 
consider the discovery process in mathematics. 
Poincaré and Hadamard (Hadamard, 1945) have 
proposed a recombination and selection mechanism 
where the subject combine some very basic ideas, 
kind of building blocks, and selects the proper 
combination. We illustrates it here for an arithmetic 
task. Siegler and Stern (Siegler & Stern, 1998), and 
Siegler and Araya (Siegler & Araya, 2005) studied 
the discovery mechanism of young kids when 
solving arithmetic problems of the form “a + b – c”, 
with b>=c (for example: 24 +12-12). After several 
trials kids started to discover that when “b=c” the 
solution was “a” and there was no need to do “a+b”, 
and then subtract “b”. The mechanism proposed has 
several basic motor and cognitive actions that are 
postulated as the building blocks of any strategy the 
kids use to solve the problems. Some of these basic 
actions are: 
 
• look at the extreme left of the string “a+b-
c”,  
• shift visual attention to the right one 
position,  
• add the two numbers in top of the working 
memory,  
• load to the working memory the number that 
is located at the spot where the visual 
attention is directed, etc.  
 
With these basic building blocks the normal 
“computational strategy” (do “a+b” and then 
subtract “c”) can be expressed as the execution of 
the following 8 actions:   
 
1. look at the extreme left of the string 
“a+b-c”,  
2. load the number at the working memory 
where the visual attention is directed,  
3. shift attention one position to the right,  
4. load the number at the working memory 
where the visual attention is directed,  
5. add the two numbers at the top of the 
working memory,  
6. shift attention one position to the right ,  
7. load the number at the working memory 
where the visual attention is directed,  





8. add the two numbers at the top of the 
working memory.  
 
We have thus two levels of description: the level 
of strategies (the higher level) and the level of the 
basic actions (the lower level). If we now represent 
graphically in as small machines each one of the 
four basic actions, then the “computational strategy” 
looks like the sequence in figure 15. It has to be read 
from right to left (as it is usual in the mathematical 





This means that first the machine of the extreme 
right “O_Left” do its job: look at the extreme left of 
the string “a+b-c” and load the number at the 
working memory where the visual attention is 
directed. Then the following machine “O_sRight” 
operates: shift attention one position to the right and 
load the number at the working memory where the 
visual attention is directed. Next, machine “O_Sum” 
adds the two numbers at the top of the working 
memory. Then again “O_sRight” shifts attention one 
position to the right and load the number at the 
working memory where the visual attention is 
directed. Finally, “O_Sum” add the two numbers at 
the top of the working memory.   
If we insert the sequence “O_sLeft O-Sum 
OsLetft” in the position indicated 
 
 





But this long sequence is redundant. It computes 
certain number that doesn t́ affect the final result. If 
the redundancy is eliminated the sequence in figure 





But this sequence is the low level of description 
of the strategy “Do b-c and then add a”, that in this 
case is just “a”.  Thus doing recombination of these 
basic actions, at some point emerges the “shortcut” 
strategy: “if b=c then a”. This discovery produces an 
“aha” moment of insight, but initially the shortcut 
strategy is used by the subject unconsciously. The 
discovery requires a cognitive mechanism for doing 
recombination of the building blocks. This is one 
mechanism that we are strongly biases towards. But 
also it is required a bias, called Goal Sketch Filter 
(Siegler, 1996; Siegler & Araya, 2005), that 
appreciates which type of recombination produce a 
feasible sequence of actions and which do not. There 
is also another heuristic that eliminates redundancy 
that could be generated at some point.  In this more 
abstract example, we see again the role of the 
cognitive and motor system of the observer in order 
to produce a new emergent strategy. A hypothetical 
observer, or a problem solver in this case, with a 
completely different cognitive system, even if he has 
the capability of action recombination, will probably 
not generate the shortcut strategy. There has to be in 
place the complete mechanism. For example, if this 
goal sketch filter were inexistent then the search of 
possibilities is huge and most strategies generated 
will not work. The generation of the new strategy is 
product of several strong inductive biases, like the 
one that decompose a phenomena as a combination 
of more elementary building blocks. With these 
biases the subject rapidly discover the shortcut 
strategy. This means, the emergence of this new and 
more efficient strategy to solve the problem is as 
dependent on the cognitive system as the structure of 
the problem “a+b-c”.   
The examples analyzed suggest that no clear law 
exist on how complexity and emergence is produced 
from the basic building blocks and rules of 
combining them alone. Everything seems to indicate 
the crucial role of the cognitive system of the 
observer. If the objects or events adequately 
combined resonates with the type of processing 
algorithms or inductive biases that the observer has 
then emergence is perceived by the observer.  
How about if we promote the use of a more 
innate format for arithmetic? For example if we train 
students to perform additions as translation to the 
right and subtraction as translation to the left on the 
number line. Would this training cause a faster 
discovery of the shortcut strategy and a faster ability 
to explain the strategy?  We have not realized a 
complete empirical study but we predict that the 
training in this spatial format have an impact on the 
time required to discover the shortcut strategy. We 
also predict that after the training students are less 






“aha” moment, and that they will consider it a very 
natural strategy and can explain better why it works.  
3.3 Emergence is not arbitrary constructed 
Similarly to the complexity notion, the concept of 
emergence depends on the observer and his 
perceptual, motor and cognitive system. It is an 
embodied notion. Is it then an arbitrary construct? 
As we have argued, the cognitive system has strong 
inductive biases for certain very specific patterns. 
They have evolved throughout our evolutionary 
history. They are several specific and effective 
heuristics that meaningfully take advantage of a 
compressed structure of the world encoded in our 
DNA and in our interaction with the world. Thus the 
emergence of a “new” phenomena from their basic 
building blocks is dependent on the cognitive system 
of the observer. However, different human observers 
have the same biases. Therefore we see the same 
emergent phenomena. 
What about the radically new emergent 
phenomena that seems clearly not present on any of 
its building blocks? For example, some properties of 
a particular molecule that are not present on the 
atoms that compose it. There seems to emerge new 
properties independent of any observer. To see why 
this is not so, consider first that molecules and atoms 
are constructions that we have designed that capture 
some very specific regularities that our perceptual, 
motor and cognitive system detects. They are very 
successful in explaining and predicting several 
features of the world. Second, consider that atoms 
have been constructed with laws of interaction, and 
that these rules implicitly imply the laws of 
molecules. This is called “weak” emergence by 
Simon (Simon, 1996). Then how come we feel that 
there is an emergent phenomena? The trick is that at 
a higher level, as Holland puts it, we can also detect 
certain macro laws. They are laws detected at a 
higher level of description. These macro laws were 
not necessarily derived by the observer from the 
laws ruling at the level of atoms. These macro laws 
are detected by other pattern recognition biases of 
the observer. These macro laws only consider 
molecules, and not lower levels constructions. At the 
molecular level the macro law description is much 
simpler for the observer because it resonates with 
some of his inductive biases and require much less 
logical computing power. According to Holland 
(Holland, 1998) descriptions formulated at the 
higher level means greats gain in comprehension. 
However this doesn´t mean that these macro laws 
cannot be obtained throughout long chains of logical 
deductions from the laws of the lower levels 
(atoms). They could require very long calculations, 
even ones that are not feasible to do in reasonable 
amount of time.  
Brain power is not unlimited and is not content 
independent. The brain has to produce solutions in a 
very limited time. Therefore the basic biases are 
encoded in DNA and executed by the nervous 
system as frugal content specific heuristics. With 
these heuristics, regularities at different levels of 
description are detected. The fact that this 
organization of detected patterns of the world works 
is a product of several biases that the observer has. 
She can describe the high order patterns because her 
cognitive system recognizes those patterns, and this 
is much simpler than to deduce them from the 
properties of the atoms. The whole effect is that it 
seems to us as if they were new emergent rules, not 
present on the lower order rules of atoms, but they 
were already there. It is just that we are using a 
different pattern detection algorithm for the 
molecules than for the atoms.   
For example, on the “a+b-c” arithmetic task, it 
can be argued that the shortcut strategy can be 
deduced logically from the properties of integer 
numbers and the properties of the addition operation. 
Therefore, the shortcut strategy would be a strategy 
that is independent of any observer. It would depend 
only on the rules that define the integers and the 
addition. However, this is not how the kids generate 
and discover the shortcut strategy. The process is a 
slow discovery process that uses several heuristics 
and that under special laboratory conditions takes 
several weeks to generate the shortcut strategy. The 
logical deduction power of the human brain is very 
limited, and therefore most eight or nine years old 
kids don t́ deduce the strategy. We have a bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1996; Gigerenzer et Al, 1999), 
with very limited computing power for logical 
deductions, but it comes with very effective and 
simple heuristics. Using these heuristics or inductive 
biases, called ecological rationality by Gigerenzer, 
the new shortcut strategy is generated unconsciously 
in a long and stochastic process where several 
regressions to previous strategies take place (Siegler, 
1996; Siegler & Stern, 1998; Siegler & Araya, 
2005). In a long Darwinian process the frequency of 
use of the new strategy augments and at some point 
the subject becomes aware of it as well. This whole 
process is a mechanism that work at the level of 
strategies, a higher level than the level of basic 
actions. At some point after several times that the 
observer has already used the shortcut strategy he 
consciously detects it and perceives it as a new 
emergent strategy. Similarly to visual illusions, the 





emergent phenomena surprises him and activates a 
chain of emotional reactions that goes with the “aha” 
experience.    
It is natural to wonder how come the atoms and 
molecules or the different objects and laws at the 
different levels of description fit so well with the 
world and have excellent predictive power. The 
answer is in the long process of construction, testing, 
and adjustments that these constructions have been 
experienced by centuries of systematic work. If for a 
particular phenomenon they don´t generate good 
predictions then at some point they are changed. 
Change in the atoms and its rules imply changes at 
the higher levels. Using this mechanism we have 
produced in some domains constructs with 
impressive predictive power.   
The emergence of a phenomenon from other 
more simple phenomena is very common in nature. 
Consider the emergence of consciousness. Each 
human cell is a small machine or robot that knows 
nothing about art or dogs. How come, asks the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett (Dennett, 2005, 2017), 
is it possible that even if they are conscious cells, 
they compose themselves into a thing with 
conscious thought about Bracque or poodles?   
Embodied emergence means that the perceptual, 
motor and cognitive systems of the observer plays a 
key role. As product of a long evolutionary process 
the search for certain specific patterns is encoded on 
his DNA and his interaction with the world. These 
algorithms captures relevant patterns of the world 
that are important for the survival of the species. 
Some of these algorithm search patterns at certain 
level of organization and need to attract the attention 
of the observer to those patterns. For example, to the 
patterns that correspond to a poodle. That´s why he 
consciously detect the poodle. Thus the emergence 
of consciousness is an embodied emergence. It is 
generated by the algorithms that detect those 
patterns at a much higher level of description than 
the cellular level. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Today we know that most reasoning is unconscious 
and abstract ideas arise from using our brains, 
bodies, and bodily experience. Even mathematics, 
once considered god´s thought, comes from 
perceptual, motor and basic innate mechanisms such 
as subitizing (Araya, 2000; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; 
Soto-Andrade, 2006). According to George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) “there 
exist no Fregean person from whom thought has 
been extruded from the body”. It is expected then 
that complexity and emergence, two basic notions 
conceived by our brains, depend on the observer and 
his perceptual, cognitive and motor system. 
Throughout several examples we have shown that 
there cannot exist a universal Fregean concept of 
complexity and emergence. This is not what 
everybody normally imagine about these concepts, 
since there is the implicit understanding that 
complexity and emergence are properties that 
depends only of the system, its elements and its 
organization. This is an example of the myth of 
objectivism (Lakoff & Johnson), where an observer 
independent world of objects exists. This world 
would contain objects such as stones and animals, 
and also would contain more abstracts objects like 
complexity and emergence. Nevertheless, we have 
seen that the complexity and the emergence of a 
phenomenon depends crucially on the observer and 
his body and brain. Furthermore, if the format of the 
information is changed, then complexity changes 
and a potential emergent phenomenon does not 
occur at all. The emergent phenomenon lives on the 
brain of the observer. It is constructed by his 
cognitive system, as a movie is constructed on the 
observer´s brain from several still images. 
Nevertheless this doesn´t mean that is arbitrary or 
completely subjective entity that doesn t́ correspond 
to real properties of the world. Because the observer 
uses evolved algorithms that detect highly 
meaningful patterns, the emergent phenomena that 
she detects are not arbitrary. Thus, in the end, the 
constructions built by different observers are not that 
different. They have a lot in common and they 
reflect real properties of the world. 
This view has important consequences for 
understanding nature and for education. Complex 
concept can be more easily understood if connected 
appropriately with intuitive and embodied 
knowledge, also called biologically primary 
knowledge. A similar process happens with the 
phenomena of emergence. If life is an emergent 
phenomenon, or consciousness is an emergent 
phenomenon, then this is something that emerges 
because they somehow resonates with the processing 
algorithms and circuits of our perceptual, motor and 
cognitive system. For example, it resonates with our 
intentional detector system. This emergence is not 
something universal that exists independent of 
human observers or observers with a cognitive 
structure similar to ours. These emergent phenomena 
are in our brains and body as much as they are out 
there in the external world. This connection with 
innate and embodied knowledge means important 






connect notions and phenomena to students' innate 
and embodied knowledge, then these notions 
become less complex and the emergent phenomenon 
loses its magic. This way students can realize that 
apparently new phenomena becomes logically 
connected to the subjacent phenomena. 
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